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21. Introduction
Governance objectives of stakeholder-oriented firms encompass the welfare
of non-shareholder groups such as employees, customers, and the commu-
nity at-large. Economists, however, are often sceptical about the practice of
stakeholder-oriented governance. Tirole (2001) points out that the provision
of adequate incentives for management to maximize the welfare of stake-
holders is fraught with difficulties and that conflicting preferences among
stakeholders inhibit implementation of the stakeholder ideal. Jensen (2001)
argues that firms that attempt to follow the stakeholder ideal will not survive
competition from profit-maximizing firms. Yet stakeholder-oriented firms
continue to survive in many sectors where they compete with shareholder-
owned firms (Hansmann, 1996).
In this paper, we offer a new perspective on the continued existence of
stakeholder-oriented firms in competitive industries. We study survival of
Norwegian savings banks after deregulation of the banking industry in the
mid-1980s subjected savings banks to the full force of competition from
commercial banks. Based on Putnam (1993), we hypothesize that in a com-
petitive banking market, savings banks’ efficiency and survival depend on
the levels of trust and civic engagement (social capital) in the communities
where the banks operate.1
The relation between social capital and savings banks’ viability follows
from the banks’ organizational form: Savings banks are institutions for
collective action by stakeholder groups from the banks’ areas of location
because they are governed by representatives of depositors, local govern-
ment councils, and employees. They are non-profit firms, prohibited from
distributing profits and no group holds residual cash flow rights.2 Savings
banks, therefore, have goals other than profit-maximization, and pursue both
financial and social objectives. Social capital improves savings banks’ effi-
ciency by facilitating collective action among the banks’ stakeholders.3 To
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to explore the role of social
capital in stakeholder-governed firms.
We first show that savings banks survive longer as independent non-profit
firms if they are located in communities with high social capital, and that
1 Because trust and civic engagement are key aspects of social capital, in the paper, we
will refer to trust and civic engagement as “social capital”. Social capital may be defined
as relations between people “that enable participants to act together more effectively to
pursue shared objectives for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995).
2 See Hansmann (1996) for a definition of non-profit firms.
3 “Efficiency” is here understood in the sense of Putnam (1993), indicating ability to
achieve the institutions’ objectives rather than in the more standard sense of profit-
maximization, as we explain below.
3social capital increases the probability of survival by up to 20 percentage
points. This result obtains after controlling for banks’ financial health and
a range of local population and market characteristics that may influence
banks’ underlying business opportunities, including unemployment, and dis-
tributions of age, income, and wealth. The result, therefore, does not follow
from a lack of business opportunities and consequent low market penetration
by competitors in communities with high social capital. We subsequently
show that social capital does not affect the survival of competing commer-
cial banks whose organizational form implies that collective action among
stakeholders do not play a pivotal role in their governance.
Putnam (1993) argues that social capital improves the efficiency of insti-
tutions for collective action by affecting both the demand for and the supply
of their services. Citizens in higher social capital communities demand more
effective institutional services. An efficient collective institution is in turn
responsive to the demands of the community. Consistent with this mecha-
nism, we show that savings banks located in high-social capital areas raise
a larger fraction of their deposits in their home regions, they operate more
locally-focused branch networks, and they distribute more of their profits
as gifts to their local communities. Savings banks located in the areas with
the highest level of social capital raise 25 percent more deposits locally and
donate 27 percent more compared to banks in the poorest social capital
areas.
Last, we investigate whether higher social capital savings banks display
distinct financial performance. We find that high social capital banks earn
lower returns on assets. This lower profitability, however, does not seem to
result from poorly performing loan portfolios, but from lower interest rate
margins, consistent with our hypothesis that stakeholders’ social goals are
prominent in efficiently-governed savings banks’ objective functions. Over-
all, our results suggest that social capital plays a role for the efficiency of
stakeholder governance and, consequently, the subsistence of nonprofit firms
in competitive markets.
Norwegian savings banks compete in the same product markets as for-
profit banks and have, since a comprehensive deregulation of branching and
credit restrictions in the mid-1980s, faced severe product competition from
the branch networks of for-profit banks. The location of most savings banks
operating at the time of deregulation is pre-determined in the 19th century.
Consequently, the Norwegian scenario of banking deregulation sets up a
quasi-experiment: We observe the disappearance (“exits”) of banks from
the population of savings banks from around the time of deregulation (1987)
until 2005, and explore which bank and community characteristics determine
whether a bank in a given location is able to survive in the competitive
4regime. During the sample period, about 50 percent of the banks exit the
sample and cease to exist as independent savings banks. Typically, a lack of
long-run profitability causes banks to exit by changing their organizational
form or accepting acquisition by a larger bank, but exit may also be due to
outright failure. At the end of our sample, 102 savings banks compete with
31 other, for-profit banks in Norway.
For every year of the sample, we map out the location of all Norwegian
banks’ branches, placing each branch in one of the 433 municipalities and
match this data with measures of the level of, among others, social capital
in each municipality. We then set up a discrete time survival model and
estimate the probability of exit as a function of the level of social capital in
the municipalities where the banks operate, controlling for other bank and
municipality characteristics. The analysis is conducted with three different
measures of trust and civic engagement together with their first principal
component: a score of trust from the World Values Survey, households’ news-
paper subscriptions, and donations to charity.
Our paper is related to the literature on firms with stakeholder-oriented
objectives. Fauver and Fuerst (2006) find that employee representation on
German corporate boards increases firms’ market value. Consistent with
our approach, Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2015) argue that stakeholder-
oriented firms’ overriding objective is survival in the long term. Ewerhart
and Zubrickas (2013) model cooperative banks as optimal intermediaries for
depositors with a preference for social equality. Fuertes, Izzeldin, Ongena,
and Pappas (2013) show that Islamic banks have a lower risk of failure
than conventional banks, suggesting that depositors loyalty instilled by re-
ligious beliefs has a role in governance. Illueca and Norden (2013) find that
a shift of control from local to regional governments increases risk-taking by
state-owned savings banks. Finally, Bøhren and Josefsen (2013) study the
financial performance of Norwegian banks and find that savings banks gen-
erate returns that are comparable to those produced by commercial banks.
The latter compares the performance of banks with different organizational
forms, whereas we focus on non-profit banks and propose a link between
social capital and the viability of that organizational form. In addition, our
paper is linked with the property rights literature that addresses distinct fea-
tures of shareholder versus stakeholder ownership, e.g. Hansmann (1996),
Hart and Moore (1998), and Rey and Tirole (2007). Our analysis suggests
that social capital may facilitate efficient stakeholder-governance.
Our work is also related to the literature examining the effect of social
capital on economic outcomes. Knack and Keefer (1997) and LaPorta et
al. (1997) show that countries with more trust have higher economic growth
and more efficient judicial systems. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004;
52008) document that more trusting individuals are more likely to invest in
stocks and make less use of informal credit. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2009) and Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2015) find that trust enhances
cross-border trade and investment.4 Mistrulli and Vacca (2014) show that,
in high social capital regions, financial shocks cause smaller increases in the
cost of credit. The theme in these papers is how social capital and generalized
trust between counter-parties facilitate financial contracting and economic
exchange. While we also consider trust concerning peoples’ general beliefs
about others’ behavior, we study how those beliefs facilitate collective action.
Finally, our paper is related to a large group of papers on the conse-
quences of banking deregulations, including Jayaratne and Strahan (1997),
Bertrand, Schoar, and Thesmar (2007), Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and
Sørensen (2007), and Rice and Strahan (2010). These papers study how
increased competition between banks affects economic and bank-level effi-
ciency, such as regional growth, risk sharing, and the terms of finance ex-
tended to borrowers. Our paper is similar in that it studies how deregulation
forces inefficient banks to exit, but in our setting, banks have social objec-
tives, and we study the efficiency of stakeholder governance rather than
profit maximization.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2. we discuss the link between
community social capital and savings banks’ viability. Section 3. provides a
brief overview of the Norwegian banking industry and its development since
deregulation. Section 4. describes our data, and Section 5. the methodology.
Section 6. discusses the empirical results, and Section 7. concludes.
2. Trust, civic engagement, and savings banks’ viability
Norwegian savings banks have no owners but are governed by local stake-
holders. Depositors and representatives of the municipality governments in
the banks’ areas of location each elect an equal number of persons to the
Board of Representatives, which in turn elects the Board of Directors and
the Control Committee. Depositors from all municipalities where a bank has
branches are eligible to be elected and to vote.5 The two boards together
4 In a related vein, Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) provide evidence that cultural distance
between professional decision-makers affects lending conditions in the syndicated bank
loan market.
5 Statutory law requires that savings banks’ bylaws specify the municipalities from which
voters and members of the banks’ governing bodies should be drawn. We randomly sam-
pled the 1987-bylaws from 22 savings banks of varying size, to investigate the municipal-
ities named in the bylaws. We found that the bylaws named the municipalities in which
6elect the CEO.6 The Board of Representatives has a supervisory function
vis-a-vis the Board of Directors and will typically set out overall directions
for the banks’ strategy. More detailed supervision of the banks’ operations
is left to the Control Committee (Bryhni et al. 1985).
Statutory law prohibits savings banks from distributing net profits and
requires that residual earnings are used to replenish equity capital or dis-
tributed for charitable purposes.7 The non-distribution constraint and the
representation of stakeholder groups in banks’ governing bodies imply that
the banks are designed to internalize their stakeholders’ interests and have
other objectives than the maximization of profits.
Indeed, savings banks have historically pursued both financial and social
objectives (Schmidt, 2009). Hansmann (1996) emphasizes that U.S. savings
banks were established in response to financial exclusion, providing services
to social groups that commercial banks were not prepared to serve at the
time. In Norway, social responsibility continues to be an integral part of
banks’ strategies, notably in the form of distributions from the gift fund to
the banks’ local communities (see Section 3.) .
Essentially, Norwegian savings banks are institutions where representa-
tives of different stakeholder groups act collectively to achieve financial and
social objectives. Putnam (1993) argues that institutions for collective ac-
tion operate more efficiently in communities with high levels of trust and
civic engagement in community affairs, with implications for both the de-
mand for and the supply of these institutions’ services: “[C]itizens in civic
communities [...] demand more effective public service, and they are pre-
pared to act collectively to achieve their shared goals.”8 As for the supply
of institutional services, he argues that “[a] good [collective institution] not
only considers the demands of its citizenry (that is, is responsive), but also
acts efficaciously upon these demands (that is, is effective).”9
Prior to deregulation, Norwegian savings banks were protected from com-
petition. Deregulation enabled banks to open branches on each others’ turfs,
which, in turn, enabled local depositors to move their savings to competing
the bank had branches, and, in a few cases, one (or a couple of) adjacent municipalities
without branches.
6 Depositors and local governments together elect 3/4s of the board. The remaining 1/4
is elected by bank employees.
7 A maximum of 25 percent of annual earnings can be set aside in a separate gift fund and
distributed for charitable purposes. The rest of the profits is to be retained and reinvested
in the bank. In the case of a dissolution, any remaining equity capital must be used to
further savings banks business in the bank’s home area. In the case of an acquisition by
another savings bank, retained equity is transferred to the merged bank.
8 Putnam (1993), page 182.
9 Putnam (1993), page 63.
7banks at low costs if dissatisfied with their local bank. Thus, the financial
foundation of banks no longer patronized by their local communities could
be undermined, and their equity exhausted over time (Hansmann, 1996).
We hypothesize that in a deregulated environment, social capital mat-
ters for the survival of savings banks: In communities with high trust and
civic engagement, stakeholder-governed banks operate more efficiently in the
sense of Putnam (1993) and, consequently, survive longer. Banks located
in such environments will resist mergers, not convert their organizational
form, and abstain from the pursuit of business strategies that involve a
high probability of default, as these all imply the assumption of control
by community-outsiders.10 This is our main hypothesis and we test it in
Section 6.. In contrast, social capital should not play a role for the sur-
vival of banks of other organizational forms in which collective action by
stakeholder groups is less likely to play a role in governance–we test this
implication too, using data on Norwegian commercial banks whose owners
(shareholders) hold residual cash flow rights (Section 6.4).
The relation between social capital and the viability of Norwegian savings
banks may be explored further by examining the underlying mechanisms
relating to the demand for and supply of collective institutions’ services.
Building on Putnam (1993), and illustrated in the quotation above, we
investigate three mechanisms. First, we propose that in communities with
higher levels of social capital, community members patronize local banks
by depositing more of their savings in local banks. A stable deposit base
is a necessary condition for the long-term survival of banks with limited
access to wholesale money markets. We also test whether the local funding
of high-social capital banks is more stable in the presence of a common
shock to the economy. A large common shock during our sample period is
the Norwegian banking crisis which lasted from 1988 to 1993. The crisis is
a time period where retail savers faced high uncertainty about the situation
of financial institutions and their loyalty would have been tested. Second,
the supply side aspect of efficiency suggests that decision-making in high-
social capital banks is more responsive to social demands of the community
in the bank’s home area. We test whether banks in high social capital areas
allocate contribute more to local charity and whether they choose strategies
that are more locally oriented by examining the geographical dispersion of
their branch network.
10 Conversions of savings banks organizational form have been permitted since 1987
through the issue of a form of equity that introduces owners with residual cash flow
rights into the banks’ governing bodies (see Section 3.)
83. A brief history of Norwegian savings banks
At their origin, the savings banks in Norway were a philanthropic project for
the bourgeoisie to further the idea of saving among common people. The first
banks were established in the larger towns in the 1820s, and thereafter spread
to the smaller towns and the countryside. They were organized without
owners, had a strong local focus, and part of the surplus was distributed
as charity. From the middle of the 19th century the banks incorporated
lending as part of their main activities and have, since then, served as an
important source of finance for local firms and households (Thue, 2014).
In 1960, 600 savings banks were operating in the country, but economic
structural changes prompted a rapid consolidation of the sector, which was
more than halved by the mid-1980s.11
Free competition in the Norwegian banking industry was introduced with
credit market reforms in the 1980s. Until 1984, quantitative regulations and
restrictions on bank branching effectively provided protection for savings
banks against entry from outside banks.12 The suspension of restrictions
enhanced competition and prompted further consolidation of the industry:
From the time of deregulation till the present, another 50 percent of the
independent savings banks agreed to acquisitions or converted its organi-
zational form. Savings banks have been able to convert their charter and
increase equity capital through the issue of so-called Primary Capital Cer-
tificates (PCCs) since 1987. PCCs are residual claims on the banks’ surplus
and are traded on the Oslo Stock Exchange.13
Both acquisitions and conversions have been used by savings banks to ac-
celerate growth, resulting in regional banks capable of competing with the
largest commercial banks. Furthermore, three strategic alliances between
independent savings banks were set up during the 1990s.14 Banks within
an alliance do typically not operate branches on each others’ home turfs.
They do, however, compete with branches of savings banks from the other
11 In contrast to savings banks in many other countries, Norwegian savings banks are
strongly engaged in business lending. At the beginning of our sample, in 1987, loans to
businesses made up 31 percent of saving banks’ portfolios, of which 24 percent were com-
mercial and industrial loans. In 2005, these fractions were 26 and 23 percent, respectively.
12 To establish new branches, banks were required to obtain approval from the Ministry
of Finance, which, through a lengthy process, would consult with the respective local
authorities. See also (Norwegian Official Reports , 1992, pp. 66–67).
13 A PCC bank is a hybrid between a commercial bank and a savings bank—it has outside
owners with voting and residual cash-flow rights who constitute the largest stakeholder
block in the Committee of Representatives.
14 See the Norwegian Savings Bank Association (www.sparebankforeningen.no).
9alliances, or savings banks outside the alliances. Hence, savings banks com-
pete not just with commercial banks but also with each other.
The banking crisis in 1988-1993 also contributed to the transformation
of the industry. From 1988 to 1990, 14 small and some regional banks
failed, mostly savings banks. Towards the end of 1990, the situation deterio-
rated and the crisis became systemic, forcing the government to establish a
governmentally-financed insurance fund.15 None of the failed savings banks
were closed. Instead, they were acquired by larger solvent savings banks,
or made to sell their devalued equity capital to the Savings Bank Guaran-
tee Fund through the issue of PCCs. 15 acquisitions of savings banks and
3 PCC-conversions were the results of these rescue operations, correspond-
ing to 20 percent of the savings banks exits in the sample. The pattern
of failures during the crisis contains relevant information for our analysis:
Savings banks in low social capital areas are more likely to shift risk and
consequently exit early in a deregulated regime.16
Overall, regulatory changes and the consequent transformation of the
banking industry resulted in a decrease in the number of savings banks
from 191 in 1987 to 102 in 2005. 23 banks converted to PCC-form. The
remaining savings banks were acquired by larger banks.
4. Measuring social capital
Trust and civic engagement are key dimensions of social capital (Coleman,
1988; Putnam 1993, 1995, and 2000). We proxy the level of social capital
within a community with three different measures that reflect these dimen-
sions: (1) a measure of trust from the 1990 World Values Survey, (2) house-
hold subscriptions to newspapers, and (3) charity donations. By nature, the
measurement of unobservable social capital is not straightforward. For our
purposes, proxies for social capital must be available at the municipality or
county level, display cross-sectional variation, and not be causally affected
by savings banks’ probability of survival. We discuss each measure in turn
and refer to the data appendix for the remaining variables used in the re-
gressions.
Trust facilitates cooperation towards the implementation of common
goals.17 We follow Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) and use the WVS
15 At the peak of the crisis in 1991, aggregate loan loss provisions by commercial banks
constituted more than 4% of total assets, whereas provisions by savings banks were about
2% of assets.
16 See Moe, Solheim, and Vale (2004) for an account of the Norwegian banking crisis.
17 The social capital literature distinguishes between generalized and personalized trust
(see Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005). The first pertains to people’s preconceptions con-
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trust measure to proxy for social capital. Our measure of trust thus indi-
cates, on a score of 1–5, the level of trust towards other Norwegians where
the score of 5 indicates high trust and the score of 1 high distrust. The
variable is available at the county-level.
Interest and knowledge about public issues are necessary conditions for
civic engagement in community affairs. Being informed fosters discussion
and connectedness among community members. Newspaper readership has
been suggested as a measure of civic engagement by Putnam (1993). We use
a measure of the average number of newspapers subscribed to by households
in each municipality.18
Altruism and volunteering indicate peoples’ willingness to contribute to-
wards a general goal at the price of reduced individual consumption and
are strongly related to civic engagement.19 Our charity donation measure
comes from the annual Norwegian TV charity show—a prime time media
event broadcasted nationally on a Sunday in October with the purpose of
raising donations for a particular charity organization. On the day of the
charity show, door-to-door collections are carried out by volunteers from
municipalities all over the country. We construct a municipality-level dona-
tion ratio based on the amount raised in day-time door-to-door collections
defined as the average donation per unit of income.
Due to its mountainous geography, Norway has a distinct regional char-
acter with many small communities and strong regional identities, and the
cultural distinctiveness of its regions have been documented by Norwegian
sociologists. Since late medieval times, the Southern and Western commu-
nities have been more equalitarian communities where forested and agricul-
tural land holdings were of homogeneous small size. In contrast, the North-
ern, Central, and Eastern regions have had more feudal characteristics with
smallholders, forestry and seasonal laborers depending on a few dominant
forest owners and large-scale landowners (Rokkan, 1967). Thus, the socioe-
conomic heterogeneity of Norwegian communities may be part of the ex-
cerning the behavior of other people not necessarily known to them. The latter concerns
the beliefs of one agent about the behavior of another arising from interactions between
the two. We focus on generalized trust, so that we are concerned with what might be
considered cursory beliefs and generalizations about fellow citizens’ behaviors.
18 Norwegian households’ newspaper consumption per capita is among the highest in the
world and the newspaper distribution pattern has a distinct local character (Høst, 2005).
19 Putnam (2000) writes that “ Doing good for other people, is not part of the definition
of social capital. But [...] volunteering and philanthropy and even spontaneously helping
are all strongly predicted by civic engagement.”
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planation for the geographical pattern in social capital that we document
below.20
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the three social capital measures
across municipalities. Each map indicates high levels of social capital along
the bottom half of the West coast, but otherwise the distributions appear
quite dissimilar. This is confirmed by the low cross-correlations between
the three measures. Newspaper Subscriptions and Donation Ratio have the
highest correlation of 0.31. Trust and Newspaper Subscriptions, respectively
Trust and Donation Ratio, have correlations 0.20 and 0.14. By nature, it
is not possible to know which proxy comes closest to capturing the true
variation in social capital. Therefore, we also run regressions using the first
principal component of the three social capital measures.
5. Methodology
We use a discrete-time hazard model to estimate the relations between sav-
ings banks’ survival and social capital in the municipalities where the banks
operate.21 The relevant event is the disappearance of the savings bank as an
independent non-profit firm.
To record event occurrence, we divide the time from branching deregula-
tion into equal-sized intervals of length one year, with interval j defined as
( j − 1, j ]. Interval j = 1 is thus the first year following the date of branch-
ing deregulation, 1 January 1984.22 Let T denote the time (years) elapsed
from branching deregulation to the observed exit of savings bank i, i.e. we
have observations on n iid random variables, where n is the number of banks
observed at the beginning of interval 1. The hazard rate for bank i in year
j is defined as
hij = prob(Ti = j|Ti ≥ j, xij) , (1)
where xij is a (k × 1) vector of bank-specific (constant or time-varying)
explanatory variables of the event of bank i’s exit during observation interval
j. that measure the characteristics of bank i and the markets in which it
operates, among others, the level of social capital.
20 Accordingly, Putnam (1993) describes cultural heterogeneity and social capital as the
product of historical events and proposes that the difference in social capital between the
North and South of Italy is rooted in the free city-state experiences of the communities
in the North.
21 A detailed derivation of our methodology is provided in an internet appendix accom-
panying this paper.
22 We prefer to model the process in discrete rather than continuous time to match the
frequency of the exits and the explanatory variables, most of which are available only
annually.
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We specify a proportional odds logistic model for the hazard rate:
log
[
hij
1− hij
]
= log
[
h0j
1− h0j
]
+ β′xij (2)
⇔ hij = 1
1 + e−[θ0j+β′xij ]
. (3)
In (2), the log-odds of the hazard rate for each bank depends linearly on
xij and a “baseline” hazard of risk over time, logit(h0j) = θ0j . The base-
line hazard is common to all banks and captures the underlying process of
consolidation in the banking sector after deregulation.
We specify a functional form for θ0j ,
θ0j = α0 + α1 log(j) + α2[ log(j)]
2 . (4)
In (4), the sign of α1 controls the pattern of duration dependence for the
population of savings banks.23 We include a quadratic term to capture the
fact that the hazard rate cannot continuously decrease or increase forever
since the population of banks is fixed. The form in (4) was chosen based on a
preliminary non-parametric estimation of the baseline hazard, with the aim
of capturing the “shape” of the process of consolidation in a parsimonious
manner, preserving degrees of freedom. As a robustness check, we estimate
our main regression using time dummy variables in place of (4).
Brown (1975) and Allison (1982) show how the likelihood function for
the event of bank exit can be formulated as the likelihood function for binary
dependent variable, yij , equal to one if bank i exits during interval j and zero
otherwise. We thus estimate a logit model with yit as dependent variable and
α0, log(j), ( log(j))
2, and xij as explanatory variables.
5.1 Construction of duration and explanatory variables
We measure duration of banks’ lifetimes as follows. We collect information
on the timing of all acquisitions involving savings banks, on all issues of
PCCs, and define the event of exit to take place during the year in which
either of these two events occur.24 In the case of acquisitions, target banks
are treated as exiting. Essentially all of the mergers that occur during our
sample period have clearly defined target and acquiring banks and it is
almost always the case that the bank known to be the acquiring bank is
23 When α1 is negative the hazard rate is monotonically decreasing over time for all banks,
and vice versa for positive α1. When α1 is zero, the baseline probability of exit is constant
for all observation intervals.
24 When exit occurs right at the beginning of a year, i.e. a bank is, say, acquired on 1
January, the event is defined as having taken place during the preceding year.
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also the largest.25 New (de novo) savings banks are established during the
sample period. We exclude such banks entirely from the analysis as such
banks choose location after deregulation has occurred.26
To construct the explanatory variables in (1) we map municipality-level
data into bank-specific variables using information on the branch structure
of each bank. In each year of the sample, we know the exact location of the
banks’ branches. For every bank we can therefore construct a weighted av-
erage of the municipality-level variables, where the weights are the fractions
of the bank’s branches located in the municipalities.27
For example, let log(POPm) denote the log of the population in municipal-
itym and BRANCHESim denote the number of branches of bank i in municipal-
ity m. We construct the bank-level population variable, “log(Population)i”,
as the weighted average of (logged) population size.
log(Population)i =
∑
m
[ BRANCHESim∑
m BRANCHESim
· log(POPm)
]
. (5)
The branch structure employed in (5) is the structure that applies at the
beginning of each interval (year). Other bank-level explanatory variables,
including our measures of social capital, are constructed in a similar manner.
In the estimated model, the explanatory variable of interest is the measure
of the level of social capital in the municipalities in which a given bank
operates. In addition, we include several other variables in the regression to
control for the characteristics of the municipalities, in particular municipality
size, the proportion of residents in retirement (proxied by the fraction of the
population over 67 years of age), and the education level of the residents in
the municipality. Our measures of social capital, are likely to be correlated
with these population characteristics—omitting such characteristics might
bias our results. Also, donations to charity may be affected by the level of
income in a municipality. We therefore scale the charity donation measure
by average (gross) personal income in the municipality.
Competition from other banks is also likely to affect the survival of sav-
ings banks. We include in our regressions a bank-specific measure of the
25 Except in one case, a new bank, Sparebanken Sogn og Fjordane, was formed by a
merger of eight smaller banks. In this case, however, one bank comprised 60 percent of all
bank assets in the merger, and we define that bank to be the de-facto acquiring bank.
26 Only four new savings banks have been founded during our sample period (adding
only 7 observations to the sample). Including these observations makes no difference to
the results.
27 This calculation implicitly assumes that a bank’s branches are all of equal size. The
assumption is necessary because data on the distribution of bank assets on municipalities
do not exist.
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degree of competition a given bank faces from other banks, which we mea-
sure in alternative ways. Our preferred measure, “bank asset competition”,
captures the average weighted market share of competing banks in munic-
ipalities in which a given bank has branches. We proxy market share by
total assets assuming that all branches of a given bank are of similar size.28
The alternative competition measures; the number of competing banks, the
number of competing banks’ branches, the number of competing large banks
(size above the 90th percentile), and the number of competing commercial
banks respectively, are computed in a similar manner. Importantly, we al-
ways compute the bank market competition measures from information on
all municipalities and all banks in the Norwegian banking industry. Our com-
petition measures therefore reflect the actual competition a bank is exposed
to from all other banks.
We also want to ascertain that surviving high-social capital banks are
not located in areas void of business opportunities. Many of our control
variables capture aspects of banks’ investment opportunity set (e.g. bank
competition, unemployment, population age), but we still include a dummy
variable equal to one if a bank is the only bank present in the municipality
of its headquarter in the regression.
Furthermore, we include two measures of bank characteristics at the be-
ginning of the sample; the equity capital ratio and bank assets in 1987. The
suggestion of Hansmann (1996) that savings banks die only slowly because
they are not under pressure to generate economic profits, would suggest that
a bank can survive in a competitive regime for a longer period of time if it
starts out with a considerable level of capital. It is also possible that bank
size matters for the probability of survival. Large banks typically have more
diversified portfolios, which may improve their risk-return tradeoff, and make
them less susceptible to local economic shocks. Bank size and capitalization
are, through accounting identities, causally affected by a bank’s continued
survival and therefore we use only the 1987-values of these two variables.
Finally, we include control variables for the level of economic activity
measured by average personal income and the rate of unemployment, lagged
one period. Bank lending may lower local unemployment, and we control
for this by including the lagged rate of unemployment. In general we collect
municipality level data for as many years of the sample period as possible but
statistics are not always available for every year. In such cases, we construct
28 For a given bank, we compute the asset competition it faces as the weighted sum of
assets held by competing banks in each municipality similar to (5).
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a step-wise variable in accordance with the years of information that are
available.29
As a final test of robustness, we run our main regressions taking into
account the pattern of failed banks during the banking crisis. In particular,
for a failed bank, we determine the year of exit as the first year in which it
receives capital from the savings banks guarantee fund.30 This redefinition
effectively shifts the distribution of exit dates towards the beginning of the
sample and causes more tied observations, which may potentially reduce
identification.
6. Results and discussion
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 summarizes the structure of the Norwegian banking sector in 1987
and 2005 for savings banks, commercial banks and PCC banks respectively.
Common for savings banks and commercial banks is a consolidation in both
number of banks and number of branches. The number of non-profit savings
banks drops from 191 in 1987 to 102 in 2005 compared to a decrease in the
population of commercial banks from 22 to 3 and an increase in the popu-
lation of PCC banks from 0 to 23. The average savings bank is considerably
smaller than the average commercial or PCC bank. Savings banks have, on
average, 7.6 branches in 1987 and 3.4 in 2005, whereas the average commer-
cial bank has around 30 branches and a PCC bank has close to 20 branches.
The table also shows that savings banks that have remained independent
during the sample period tend to be much smaller than savings banks that
have converted their organizational form, consistent with growth being a
driver of PCC-conversions. PCC banks have relatively more branches in the
populous municipalities. In 1987, 28.8 percent of savings bank branches and
5.8 percent of commercial and PCC bank branches are located in municipal-
ities with below-median population. In 2005, the figures are 34.2 for savings
banks and on average 19.5 percent for the two other bank types. Hence, it
is not the case that savings banks survive because they are predominantly
located in municipalities with few inhabitants. Overall, the figures illustrate
that competition in the banking market has sharpened considerably since
deregulation, also in the smaller municipalities.
29 The data appendix, Appendix A, contains a detailed description of the construction of
all variables.
30 The guarantee fund is a private risk-sharing arrangement among the savings banks and
a draw on the fund is formally not an exit but a private capital infusion.
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Figure 2 contrasts the geographical distribution of savings bank branches
in 1987 and 2005 with the corresponding distribution of commercial and
PCC banks. The plots suggest that the competition from for-profit banks
intensified over the sample period. The dilution of savings banks has oc-
curred all over the country but has been especially strong in the northern
part.
In Table 2, we display bank-level statistics for the social capital variables
which display significant variation cross-sectionally. The low variation of
Trust is likely due it being measured at the county level, whereas the other
variables are measured at the municipality level. For the remaining variables
used in the regressions, we refer the reader to the Appendices where we
describe the construction and data sources of control variables and provide
basic descriptive statistics.
Table 3 provides a summary of the annual number of exits from our sam-
ple of savings banks from 1987 and onwards. The second column shows the
number of savings banks present in the beginning of a given year and the
third column gives the number of bank exits during each year. Out of the
191 savings banks at the beginning of the sample period, 102 savings banks
survive until the end of the sample. The last two columns in the table state
estimated Kaplan-Meier survival probabilities and interval hazard rates. The
hazard probability is highest in the earliest years of the sample, around 7
percent, and then falls to a lower level of a few percent. It is not mono-
tonically decreasing over time: Exits are clustered in the years right after
deregulation and at the end of the 1990s.
6.2 Logit regressions of the probability of exit
Table 4 shows the results from logit regressions of the hazard rate on a
baseline hazard and explanatory variables. Models (1)–(5) employ the con-
tinuous social capital variables described in Section 4., whereas Models (6)–
(10), replace the continuous variables with dummy variables indicating an
above-average, “high”, level of social capital.31 The two specifications are
alternative ways of modeling the effect of social capital. In the continuous
variable-specification, the effect of social capital is assumed to monotonically
increasing in the value of the variable. This may be a quite rigid restriction
to impose on the data. Given the nature of social capital, one may prefer
to treat it as a categorial variable that only distinguishes between high and
low levels. We therefore show results with both specifications.
The estimated Models (1)-(4) and (6)-(9) show that all three measures of
social capital have a significant and negative effect on the hazard rate, that
31 The average is taken across all municipalities.
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is, savings banks’ probability of exit in a given period is lower when banks’
branches are located in municipalities with a high(er) level of social capital.
The effects are all significant at the five percent level or less in both model
specifications.
To illustrate the interpretation of the estimated coefficients, consider first
the estimated baseline hazard function, α0 + ln(j) + ln(j)
2. In period one,
i.e. 1987, j equals 1 and the baseline hazard reduces to α0. In Model (2), for
example, the estimated value of α0 is positive and equals 4.66, which implies
that the odds, ( h1−h), in period one exceeds 1—the baseline probability of
exit is higher than the probability of survival. One can compute that the
baseline probability of exit in period one equals 0.991, or 99.1 percent.32
The negative sign of the estimated coefficient on Newspaper Subscriptions
(-1.33) then implies that a bank with a value of Newspaper Subscriptions
equal to 1, has a 94.7 percent probability of exit in period one assuming for
simplicity that the values of all other variables are zero.33 That is, depending
on their signs, the coefficient of the explanatory variables shift the baseline
hazard up or down, in the scale of logit-hazard.34 The estimated signs of
the coefficients of the second and third term in the baseline hazard function
imply that the probability of exiting over time is bell shaped, increasing at
first but then falling over time. The estimated joint effect of these two terms
is statistically significant at a level less than 1 percent (LR-Test 2).
The estimated effect of banks’ equity ratio at the onset of the deregu-
lated regime is also negative and statistically significant at a level below 1
percent—capitalization is clearly an important determinant of the viability
of non-profit banks, and this makes economic sense since capital improves a
bank’s ability to withstand shocks.
In Columns (5) and (10) we run a horse race between the three measures
of social capital. The estimates and levels of significance remain remarkably
unchanged, indicating that each measure contains independent information
and is picking up different aspects of social capital.
Of the other explanatory variables included in the regression, several are
significant at the 5 or 10 percent level. The measure of business risk, Frac-
tion of C&I Loans in 1987, is highly significant, reflecting, as predicted, that
banks carrying relatively more risk on their books in the years just prior
to the crisis, were more likely to exit. More intense competition increases
the probability of exit as would be expected—Bank Asset Competition is
32 h = 0.991 solves ln( h
1−h ) = 4.66.
33 From ln( h
1−h ) = 4.46-1.33.
34 Notice that the probability of exit in 1987 for a given bank depends on its value of
all the variables in the model and these will in general not be equal to zero as the above
calculations assume.
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significant at levels around 10 percent. Large municipality size (Population)
lowers the probability of exit, which may reflect the existence of underly-
ing business opportunities. Many of the savings banks that have pursued a
growth strategy after deregulation are headquartered in the more densely
populated regional centers and have been acquiring other banks in mergers.
Only Bank in Home Municipality has a positive sign, implying that being
a single bank in an area increases the probability of exit. The variable is
insignificant, but its sign reflects that being a single bank in an area does
not automatically increase lifetime duration. Hence, our results do not re-
flect that savings banks survive simply because they are located in areas
without competition. Banks that operate without competition from other
banks are probably more likely to be situated in a region void of business
opportunities, which in turn, increases the likelihood of exit. Population over
67 years is significant at levels around 15 percent with a positive sign, that
is, we do not find evidence that non-profit banks located in communities
with a less active population are able to survive longer. In fact, we find
evidence of the opposite. Higher Median Income increases the probability
of exit, but the coefficient estimate is borderline significant. The estimated
coefficients of Total Assets, Education and Unemployment are all insignif-
icant, as are State and Municipality Owned Enterprises and Population in
Urban Settlement. Finally, we observe that the R-squared is of similar size
in all regressions.
In Table 5 we re-estimate the two specifications replacing the parametric
log-baseline hazard function with a dummy variable for each period j in
which at least one bank exit occurs. The latter specification may capture
time-varying macroeconomic developments better than the models with the
log-baseline hazard, but, on the other hand, entails a loss of degrees of
freedom given that we estimate 19 additional parameters. In fact, in four
periods the baseline hazard is inestimable because no bank exit occurs in
those years. The results are quite similar to those of Table 4. The estimated
coefficients are of the same sign and similar magnitude, and we conclude
that our results are robust to alternative specifications of the effect of time.
However, because the parametric baseline specification performs as well as
the general dummy-variable specification, but is more parsimonious and can
be estimated for all periods, we conduct the rest of our analysis with the
log-baseline function.
To get a sense of the economic importance of our results, we use Model (1)
in Table 4 to estimate the marginal effect of a discrete change in the value of
Trust in the year of 1987, assuming that all other explanatory variables are
held at their mean values. When the average level of Trust increases from its
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minimum value of 3.92 to its maximum of 4.33, the estimated probability of
exit decreases by 6.6 percentage points for the average bank. In the middle of
the sample period, 1997, the probability decreases by 2.2 percentage points,
reflecting that the probability of exit is estimated to be highest in the begin-
ning of the period. For Subscriptions and Donation, Models (2) and (3), the
estimated marginal effects are –9.7 and –19.0 percent in 1987, and –3.0 and
–4.3 percent in 1997. If one instead considers a discrete increase in Trust of
one standard deviation around the mean (from 1/2 standard deviation below
to 1/2 above), the corresponding decrease in the probabilities of exit are –1.6
in 1987 and –0.5 percentage points in 1997. For Subscriptions the decrease
in probabilities are –1.7 and –0.5, and for Donation –3.3 and –0.7 percentage
points respectively. Clearly, for a hypothetical average bank, the economic
importance of social capital is considerable when we compare the minimum
and maximum values of social capital observed in the sample, but smaller if
we look at a smaller change in social capital of one standard-deviation. This
suggests that average banks that operate in markets with an average level
of social capital experience a relatively modest effect of it. However, banks
that operate in communities with above-average social capital experience a
markedly improved probability of survival.
The importance of social capital becomes further pronounced when one
considers its interaction with other key variables. Economic intuition would
suggest that a bank’s capitalization at the time of deregulation should be
one of the most important factors for survival, since well-capitalized non-
profit firms may continue to survive for long periods of time even if they
operate with losses (Hansmann, 1996). Indeed, our estimates corroborate
the importance of a bank’s 1987-level of equity. The estimated marginal
effect of changes in the ratio of equity capital in Models (1)–(3) is consid-
erable. In 1987, a discrete change in Equity Ratio from its minimum to its
maximum level, decreases the probability of exit by 43.8, 41.3, and 51.2 per-
centage points according to Models (1), respectively (2) and (3), holding all
other explanatory variables at their means. Our estimates therefore suggest
that social capital may work as a substitute to equity capital: Banks that
enjoy the patronage of the local community may operate with lower levels
of capital. Generally, smaller banks, including savings banks, tend to op-
erate with considerably more equity than larger banks due to their lack of
access to wholesale funding (and, possibly, lack of implicit government guar-
antees due to their smaller systemic importance) but higher capitalization
is costly. Banks in high social capital communities may enjoy a competitive
advantage.
In Figure 3, we illustrate this interaction between social capital and equity
capital. We depict the estimated effect of social capital on the probability
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of exit for different values of Equity Ratio in 1987, using the estimates of
Models (1)–(3). All other explanatory variables are held at their mean values.
The plots show that for a (hypothetical) average bank with Equity Ratio
equal to the minimum ratio observed in our sample, social capital has a
markedly higher effect on the probability of exit compared with a bank with
average social capital. On the other hand, social capital has almost no effect
on the survival probability of a bank with the maximum observed equity
ratio.
6.3 Robustness
Table 7. shows regression results with alternative measures of bank market
competition. The regression specification is similar to Models (1)–(4) in Ta-
ble 4. As can be seen, the estimated coefficients on Trust, Subscriptions,
Donation, and Principal Component are all robust to different measures of
competition. The estimated coefficients on the competition measures them-
selves are all insignificant at conventional levels and less significant than our
preferred measure of competing, Bank Asset Competition, used in Table 4.
It is interesting, however, that the sign of the competition measure in Mod-
els (9)–(12), CB Branch Competition which measures competing branches of
commercial banks, changes to negative and is close to being significant, in-
dicating that stronger competition from commercial banks lowers the prob-
ability of exit. This seems to indicate some market segmentation, consistent
with customers of savings banks having a preference for the non-profit or-
ganizational form. The insignificance of the results, however, provides only
suggestive evidence for such an effect.
As a second test of robustness, we run our main regressions redefining
the timing of bank exits during the banking crisis. Thus far in the analysis,
all banks, including financially troubled banks, have been set to exit in the
year in which they were acquired or issued PCCs. In Table 7 we redefine the
year of exit for troubled banks as the first year in which they receive capital
from the savings banks guarantee fund. That year typically precedes the
year of acquisition or a PCC emission. The savings banks guarantee fund is
a private insurance fund and, with the exception of two banks, savings banks
did not receive government emergency funding during the crisis.35 Table 7
35 The two exceptions, Sparebanken Midt-Norge and Sparebanken Rogaland, received
funding from the guarantee fund in 1991 when the fund was forced to borrow from the
government. Hence, in practice, for these two banks, the year of private and public emer-
gency funding coincides. Other troubled savings banks drew on the guarantee funding
before it ran out of money. Further information on capital infusions from the savings bank
guarantee fund may be found in Moe, Solheim, and Vale (2004), ch. 6.
21
displays the results of the redefined survival regressions. The results show
that the effect of social capital is robust to this change in specification.
Our main survival model specification does not contain time-varying bank
performance measures, only measures of performance in 1987. This choice is
for precautionary reasons: Contemporary performance measures may suffer
from rate dependence, i.e. performance may be affected by the risk of exit,
which in turn prevents causal inference. For example, the risk of exit may be
determined by a bank’s business strategy (growth vs. local focus), and the
risk and return associated with a particular business strategy will obviously
impact performance.36
On the other hand, omitted variables may lead to biased estimates of
social capital’s effect on exit. This would be the case if bank performance
is correlated with the risk of exit as well as social capital. For example,
bank performance may be correlated with the wealth of the bank’s customer
base, which again, may be correlated with social capital. Although such a
link is less straightforward, it cannot be ruled out, and we therefore include
numerous time-varying demographic characteristics of a bank’s local area as
control variables in the regressions.
Although we prefer not to include time-varying bank performance mea-
sures in our regressions, we nevertheless present results with such measures
included in Table 8 as a third test of robustness. To help alleviate rate de-
pendence problems, we lag the measures one period. We include a measure of
return (Return-On-Assets, ROA) and risk (Past Due Loans), as well as the
time-varying Equity Ratio. We already know from the results in Table 4, that
capitalization is the economically most important driver of banks’ longevity.
Because past due loans is only available from 1992, we present results both
with and without that variable. In Models (1)–(4), we control for ROA and
the equity-ratio.37 Although the coefficient on Trust is no longer significant
at the 5 percent level, which may be due to the fact that it varies only at the
county level, all estimates of social capital’s effect on exit remain negative
and, in the case of the other two measures, significantly different from zero,
although the estimated coefficient on Donation appears a bit large. Despite
the insignificance of Trust, the estimate corresponding to the first principal
component remains strongly significant. When we include Past Due Loans
in columns (5)-(8), the number of observations falls considerably, as all ob-
servations prior to 1992 are now dropped from the regression. This works to
36 Banks that pursue a growth strategy are more likely to convert their organizational
form, whereas banks that maintain a local focus are less likely to convert organizational
form or agree to be acquired.
37 ROA is not available in all years for all banks, hence the number of observations is
somewhat below that of Table 4.
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our detriment, as most exits occur in the early sample period, but the results
are qualitatively unchanged compared with columns (1)–(4). We therefore
conclude that the estimated effect of social capital is robust to the inclusion
of time-varying bank performance measures.
6.4 Further explorations
In this section we present some further results in support of our hypothesis.
The link between social capital and saving banks’ survival works through
the banks’ non-profit organizational form. It follows that the longeviety of
banks that operate in the same market, but with a different organizational
form, should not display a similar dependence on social capital. To test this
implication, we conduct a duration analysis also of Norwegian commercial
banks.
In 1987, 22 commercial banks exist in Norway. Of these, all but three
banks exit by acquisition in either domestic (15 banks) or foreign (4 banks)
mergers during the sample period. Table 9 displays the survival table of
the 22 commercial banks. With this number of commercial banks, it makes
little sense to specify a survival model for commercial banks similar to that
of Table 4, because that would require estimation of 19 parameters and the
degrees of freedom are simply to few. Instead, we estimate a parsimonious
survival model of the form
logit(hij) =
k=4∑
k=1
αkDk,ij + α1 log(j) + α2[ log(j)]
2 , (6)
where the first term captures four different levels of social capital (“Low”,
“Middle-Low”, “Middle-High”, and “High”) corresponding to the quartiles
of the distribution of social capital over all municipalities, i.e. (6) estimates
a different rate of exit for each level of social capital. Dk,ij is a indicator
variable equal to one if the social capital of bank i in year j belongs to level
k, and the last two terms capture the time variation in the rate of exit. This
specification allows a straightforward estimation of how each level of social
capital affects bank survival, as captured by the estimated αks. We estimate
the model for savings banks and commercial banks in turn, measuring social
capital by the first principal component.
The results are presented in Table 10. The columns “Numbers of banks in
1987” indicate how many savings banks, respectively, commercial banks, are
located in the municipalities in each quartile at the beginning of the sample.
There is a clear difference in the location of the two types of banks. Whereas
the distribution of savings banks is skewed towards high social capital areas,
commercial banks are mainly located in the low social capital areas. As a
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case in point, only one commercial bank is located in the top group. This
is prima facie evidence that social capital matters only for the non-profit
organizational form. The table displays the point estimates of the αks and
the corresponding hazard rates. It is evident that the probability of exit is
decreasing in social capital for the savings banks, whereas it appears to be
rising for commercial banks (the “High” level coefficient cannot be estimated
with only one observation).
As a second test, we pool the observations of savings and commercial
banks and estimate a survival model of the form in Table 4, interacting the
social capital measures with an indicator variable for the commercial bank
form. We wish to test whether the effect of social capital on exit varies with
organizational form. A natural specification would be to add an interaction
term between social capital and a dummy for organizational form, SCij ·
DCBi , to the regression. This specification, however, cannot be conducted
with continuous social capital measures because these vary very little over
time and the interaction term will be almost perfectly correlated with DCBi ,
creating a problem of multicollinarity.38
We therefore rely on the dichotomous-social capital specification to test
an interaction with organizational form. The model is
logit(hij) = α0 + β0D
CB
i + β1SC
high
ij + β2D
CB
i · SChighij + δZij , (7)
where DCB and SChigh are dummy variables for the commercial bank form
and high-level social capital banks respectively, and Zit is a vector of the
remaining control variables from Table 4 including the log-baseline hazard
(α1 log(j) + α2[ log(j)]
2).39 Table 11 shows the results. The coefficient on
the social capital dummy, β1, measures the differential effect of high social
capital (as opposed to low) on savings banks’ probability of exit. As before,
this effect is negative and strongly significant (except for Donations which
is borderline significant). The sum β1 + β2 is the corresponding differential
effect of social capital for commercial banks. We test the hypothesis that
β1 + β2 = 0, that is, that there is no difference in the probability of exit for
commercial banks located in high vs. low social capital areas. As displayed in
the table, we are unable to reject the null at conventional levels of significance
(p-values are 0.39 and higher). We conclude that the effect of social capital
does not seem to exist for banks where stakeholders do not play a pivotal
role in governance.
38 The correlations between the two terms lie between 0.95 and 0.99 for the different
measures of social capital.
39 In this specification, the correlations between DCBi · SChighij and DCBi range from 0.39
to 0.59.
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An alternative test of our hypothesis, is to explore the notion of Put-
nam (1993) that social capital matters because it improves the efficiency
of collective institutions (see discussion in Section 2.). Compared with low
social capital banks, banks in high social capital areas should obtain more
deposits from the areas where they have branches, they should distribute
more of their profits to the local community as gifts and should employ
a more locally-oriented business strategy. In addition, we examine whether
high social capital banks have more stable deposit-base in their home region.
We run panel regressions of the above three characteristics on the level of
social capital of bank i including year dummies and the set of control vari-
ables from Table 4. Table 12 shows the results, using the first principal com-
ponent measure of social capital. The regressions in the first three columns
estimate the effect of social capital on the fraction of deposits raised in the
banks’ home regions. This information is available in the bank call reports
at the regional level, of which there are 23, and we define a bank’s local area
as the region in which its head-quarter is placed. We show results with and
without controls for time-varying bank performance measures. The effect of
social capital is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, and robust
to the inclusion of bank performance variables. The marginal effect of 21.38
implies that a one standard deviation increase in social capital translates
into a 4.3 percentage point increase in local deposits, whereas the difference
between the minimum and maximum level of social capital translates into
an increase of 25.2 percent.40 We measure the distribution of profits to the
bank’s local community by the fraction of annual surplus paid out as gifts or
put aside in the gift fund for future distribution. The results shows that gifts
increase in social capital. The coefficient of 0.23 implies that a one standard
deviation increase in social capital increases distributions by 4.6 percentage
points. The difference between banks with the minimum and the maximum
level of social capital corresponds to a 27.1 percent increase. Finally, we
consider the effect of social capital on the number of municipalities in which
a bank has branches and the results show that higher social capital banks
are present in fewer municipalities, consistent with them having a more local
focus. A one standard deviation increase in social capital lowers the presence
by 0.3 municipalities, the difference between minimum and maximum social
capital lowers presence by 1.7 municipalities. These marginal effects should
be seen in relation to the average presence which is 2.5 municipalities.
Lastly, we consider whether local depositors in high social capital-areas
display more loyalty towards local savings banks. We first compare the sam-
ple variation of local deposit finance (as defined in Table 12) in banks with
40 From 0.2 × 21.38 and (3.4-2.22)× 21.38 respectively, cf. Table 2.
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above-average social capital to that of banks with below-average social cap-
ital. We compute the sample variance for each bank in turn. Above-average
social capital banks (790 observations) have a mean variance of 743.8 with
a standard error of 19.7, compared with a mean variance of 838.9 and stan-
dard error of 12.7 for the below-average banks (1871 observations). A t-test
of unequal variances has a test statistic of 4.05, displaying a highly sig-
nificant tendency for high-social capital banks to have a more stable local
deposit base.
We then test whether the local funding of high-social capital banks is more
stable in the presence of a common shock to the economy. We test whether
high social capital banks have more loyal depositors by estimating whether
the Norwegian banking crisis had a differential effect on high and low social
capital banks’ reliance on local deposits by estimating the specification by
OLS
DEPOSITSit = α1SC
high
it + β1SC
low
it + α2SC
high
it ·Dcrisist + β2SC lowit ·Dcrisist + δ′Zit + it .
(8)
Equation (8) estimates a separate level of local funding for the high and low
social capital banks, allowing for different levels during and outside the crisis
period (we do not include time fixed effects because those would absorb the
effect of the crisis), and we estimate whether the effect of the crisis differs
for the two groups testing the null hypothesis that α1 + α2 equals β1 + β2.
Table 13 shows the results. We use two different measures of the crisis period,
a dummy equal to one in all crisis years, and a dummy equal to one only
in the peak years of the crisis. The latter is the period where the crisis had
become systemic and the large commercial banks were in default. The first
two columns (“All banks”) show that the coefficient estimate of the crisis’
effect is negative for both high and low social capital banks, but it is only
significant, and considerably larger, for the low social capital banks. The
test that the level of local deposits during the crisis is the same for the two
groups of banks is rejected at the 8 percent level. If we only consider the peak
period of the crisis the results are unchanged, although the negative effect
is increased especially for the low social capital banks. Although the crisis
mostly affected commercial banks, some savings banks did face financial
troubles and subsequently ceased to exist as independent banks. From the
previous results we know that these banks are more predominant in the low
social capital group of banks. We therefore check whether the results are
driven by these banks being included in the sample by omitting all savings
banks that received aid from the savings banks guarantee fund from the
regressions altogether. The last two columns of the table reveals that the
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omission of troubled banks strengthens the estimated differential effect both
in magnitude and significance.
6.5 Bank-level financial ratios
In this final section, we attempt to uncover whether social capital affects
savings banks’ choice of business strategy by examining its impact on key
financial ratios. We run GLS regressions of financial ratios on the right hand
side variables from the survival analysis with two adjustments: (1) we allow
banks’ equity ratio, total assets, and fraction of commercial and industrial
loans to vary over time instead of using the 1987-values, since these ratios
will change as banks grow in size, and (2) we include lagged loan growth
to control for differences in banks’ lending policies. We include time fixed
effects in all regressions to control for macroeconomic developments.
Table 14 displays the results from these regressions using the first princi-
pal component as the measure of social capital. We find that social capital
does have an independent effect on key financial ratios: High social capital
banks operate with lower returns on assets, with lower interest rate margins
(including fees and provisions), and lower deposit rate margins. We also
find some tentative evidence that loan rate margins are lower, although this
result is not quite significant at conventional levels.
On the loan side, we see that the proportions of past due loans, leases, and
guarantees in banks’ loan portfolios are significantly lower for high-social
capital banks. Norwegian regulation considers a loan, lease, or guarantee
past due when repayments are 90 days or more behind schedule, prompting
so-called “specified” loan loss provisions to be made from assessments of
loss given default. When we consider the rate of recovery on past due loans,
that is, the fraction of past due loans at the beginning of each year that
move from past due-status to non-delinquent status during the course of
that year, that ratio is also higher for high social capital banks, although
marginally significant only. Historical data on past due loans and recoveries
on past due loans do not go back as far in time as the data for the other
variables, because the information was not collected by financial authorities.
The shorter time series may explain the lower precision of these estimates.
Accounting variables are only rough indicators of business strategies and
banks’ objective functions. Nevertheless, our results are consistent with non-
profit banks pursuing other objectives than the maximization of profit since
high-social capital banks earn a lower return on assets. Despite this fact,
high-social capital banks survive the longest (Tables 4–7), and the lower re-
turns do not seem to be a product of higher loan losses (Table 14). Rather the
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lower returns appear to be caused by lower interest rate margins, suggesting
that these banks earn less rent.
It is possible that banks in high social capital areas make less risky loans
and therefore earn lower returns and experience lower losses. To take this into
account, we control in the regressions for the risk of individual banks’ lending
strategies by including lagged loan growth and the fraction of business loans
in the banks’ portfolios. Importantly, our finding that high social capital
banks experience a higher recovery rate on past due loans and the fact that
low, median, and high social capital banks carry a similar fraction of business
loans in their portfolios (Table A4), are at odds with the suggestion that our
results are due to less risky lending by these banks. Rather, the results are
consistent with the high social capital savings banks pursuing both social
and financial objectives.
7. Conclusion
Using data on Norwegian savings banks we provide evidence that social cap-
ital improves the viability of stakeholder-oriented firms in competitive in-
dustries. The presence of a large number of non-profit savings banks makes
the Norwegian banking sector well-suited to explore this hypothesis, because
savings banks are collectively governed by their stakeholders (local deposi-
tors, employees, and government councils).
Our main finding is that savings banks operating in communities with
high social capital survive longer as independent non-profit firms. Depending
on the measure of social capital, we estimate that a high level of social
capital decreases the probability of a bank’s disappearance by up to 20
percentage points and the effect is especially strong for banks with a low
level of equity capital. Our results also show that social capital does not
affect the survival of commercial banks whose organizational form assigns
little role for collective action by stakeholders in governance.
We suggest this relationship arises because savings banks are collectively
governed by stakeholder groups from their areas of location, and social cap-
ital improves the efficiency of stakeholder governance by increasing the de-
mand for and the supply of savings banks’ services (Putnam,1993).
We measure the efficiency of stakeholder governance by the fraction of de-
posits raised in the bank’s home region, the loyalty of local depositors in the
home region, the fraction of profits distributed for altruistic purposes to the
local community, and the geographical focus of the banks’ branch networks.
Our findings show that high social capital banks raise more deposits locally,
have a more stable local deposit base, operate more local branch networks,
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and distribute a higher proportion of their surplus for altruistic purposes
locally. Furthermore, we find that efficient stakeholder governance does not
necessarily entail better financial performance: high social capital banks earn
lower returns on assets and have lower interest rate margins suggesting that
financial performance is unlikely to be their overriding objective.
In summary, our results provide evidence that social capital matters
for the continued existence of stakeholder-oriented firms in the banking
industry. By suggesting a link between social capital and the efficiency
of stakeholder-governance, we offer a new perspective on the survival of
stakeholder-oriented firms in competitive markets.
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Fig. 1. Variation in Social Capital across Norwegian Municipalities. The maps
present variation in Trust, Newspaper Subscriptions, and Donation Ratio across
Norwegian municipalities in 1987, the first sample year. Different values of the
variables are indicated by different colors; darker colors refer to higher levels of
Trust, Newspaper Subscriptions, and Donation Ratio. Value labels are presented
separately for each variable and the number of municipalities at each level is indi-
cated in parenthesis.
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Fig. 2. Savings and Commercial Bank Presence across Norwegian Municipalities,
1987-2005. The maps present variation in the number of savings and commercial
banks present across Norwegian municipalities in 1987, the first sample year, and
2005, the last sample year. Different values of the variables are indicated by different
colors; darker colors refer to higher numbers of banks present. Value labels are
presented separately for each variable and the number of municipalities at each
level is indicated in parenthesis.
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Fig. 3. Effect of Social Capital on Banks’ Probability of Exit for Different Equity
Ratios. The figures show the effect of the social capital measures Trust, Newspaper
Subscriptions, and Donation Ratio n the probability of savings bank exit in 1987 for
hypothetical banks with different values of Equity Ratio (minimum, median, and
maximum), according to the estimates in Table 4, Models (1)–(3). The minimum,
median, and maximum values of Equity Ratio equal 3.2, 9.7, and 20.1 respectively.
All other variables are set equal to their mean values.
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Table 1 The Norwegian Banking Sector, Characteristics by Organizational Form in 1987
and 2005
1987 2005
Savings Commercial PCC Savings Commercial PCC
Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks
Number of banks 191 22 0 102 3 23
Average number of branches per bank 7.6 32.6 0 3.4 31.7 17.3
Number of single office banks 60 6 0 34 1 2
Number of small banks (< 5 branches) 140 6 0 89 1 7
Number of large banks (> 25 branches) 14 6 0 3 1 5
Total number of branches 1,445 718 0 342 415 397
Fraction of branches in below median
population municipalities (percent) 28.8 5.8 0 34.2 7.5 31.4
Fraction of branches in above median
population municipalities (percent) 71.2 94.2 0 65.8 92.5 68.6
Summary statistics of Norwegian banks and bank branches by organizational
form in 1987 and 2005 as well as their distribution on municipality popula-
tion. Four commercial banks operating as Norwegian branches of a foreign par-
ent company in 2005 are excluded from the figures for commercial banks.
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Bank-Level Social Capital Variables
Obs. Median Mean Std.dev. Min. Max.
Trust 2,412 4.07 4.05 0.08 3.92 4.33
Newspaper Subscriptions 2,412 1.17 1.19 0.27 0.50 1.93
Donation Ratio 2,412 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.48
Principal Component 2,412 2.81 2.80 0.20 2.22 3.40
Descriptive statistics for the bank-level social capital variables used in the regressions,
computed as described in Equation (5). Trust is an index of the level of trust based
on the World Values Survey in 1990 measured at the county-level. Newspaper Subscrip-
tions is the average number of subscriptions per household measured at the municipality
level. Donation Ratio is the door-collected contribution to charity per capita, divided by
average municipality income and multiplied by 1000 for scaling, measured at the mu-
nicipality level. Principal Component is the first principal component for the variables
Trust, Newspaper Subscriptions, and Donatio Ratio. The sample period is 1987–2005.
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Table 3 Empirical Survival and Hazard Functions, 1987-2005
Number of savings banks
Year present that exit Survival Interval
beg. of year during year function hazard function
1987 191 19 90% 10%
1988 172 14 83% 8%
1989 158 11 77% 7%
1990 147 11 71% 7%
1991 136 7 68% 5%
1992 129 4 65% 3%
1993 125 0 65% 0%
1994 125 1 65% 1%
1995 124 2 64% 2%
1996 122 3 62% 2%
1997 119 2 61% 2%
1998 117 0 61% 0%
1999 117 8 57% 7%
2000 109 2 56% 2%
2001 107 3 54% 3%
2002 104 0 54% 0%
2003 104 0 54% 0%
2004 104 2 53% 2%
2005 102 0 53% 0%
Summary statistics of savings banks’ survival and hazard rates.
The first column indicates each year (interval) in the sample.
The second column gives the number of savings banks left in
the sample at the beginning of each year. The third column
shows the number of exits during each year. The fourth column
shows the Kaplan-Meier survival function estimate for year j,
which equals the proportion of savings banks that survive un-
til the end of year j. The fifth column shows the estimated
interval hazard function for year j, which equals the number
of savings banks that exit in year j, divided by the number
of savings banks in the sample at the beginning of year j.
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Table 4 Effect of Social Capital on Savings Banks’ Probability of Exit
Continuous Social Capital Dichotomous Social Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Trust -4.52 – – – -4.70 -0.67 – – – -0.53
(0.01) – – – (0.01) (0.00) – – – (0.03)
Newspaper Subscriptions – -1.33 – – -1.25 – -0.78 – – -0.70
– (0.01) – – (0.01) – (0.00) – – (0.01)
Donation Ratio – – -7.55 – -9.04 – – -0.81 – -0.57
– – (0.03) – (0.01) – – (0.02) – (0.13)
Principal Component – – – -2.64 – – – – -0.73 –
– – – (0.00) – – – – (0.01) –
Equity Ratio (1987) -0.39 -0.38 -0.37 -0.38 -0.40 -0.39 -0.38 -0.39 -0.39 -0.40
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Total Assets) (1987) 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.06
(0.38) (0.71) (0.28) (0.75) (0.44) (0.39) (0.59) (0.33) (0.65) (0.61)
Fraction of C&I Loans (1987) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Bank Asset Competition 1.61 1.34 1.63 1.32 1.58 1.58 1.43 1.62 1.53 1.44
(0.10) (0.15) (0.08) (0.16) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13)
Only Bank in Home Municipality 0.79 0.63 0.75 0.60 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.75 0.71 0.59
(0.14) (0.23) (0.16) (0.26) (0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.16) (0.19) (0.27)
Log(Population) -0.54 -0.50 -0.76 -0.58 -0.86 -0.52 -0.49 -0.63 -0.51 -0.53
(0.08) (0.09) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.08) (0.10) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08)
Population with High Education -0.16 -0.14 -0.06 -0.08 0.03 -0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.14 -0.14
(0.53) (0.60) (0.82) (0.75) (0.92) (0.64) (0.59) (0.50) (0.60) (0.61)
Population over 67 Years 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.06
(0.14) (0.19) (0.05) (0.31) (0.38) (0.08) (0.19) (0.07) (0.23) (0.38)
Population in Work Force -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 -0.08 -0.14 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08
(0.65) (0.49) (0.23) (0.33) (0.09) (0.76) (0.41) (0.38) (0.31) (0.31)
Median Income 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.14) (0.20) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.32)
Median Wealth -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00
(0.44) (0.76) (0.56) (0.85) (0.80) (0.71) (0.94) (0.41) (0.75) (0.75)
Unemployment (lagged) -0.17 -0.16 -0.13 -0.15 -0.10 -0.17 -0.17 -0.12 -0.16 -0.15
(0.24) (0.24) (0.36) (0.29) (0.49) (0.22) (0.23) (0.40) (0.24) (0.31)
Reported Breaches of Law -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
(0.83) (0.73) (0.87) (0.81) (0.78) (0.76) (0.68) (0.77) (0.68) (0.99)
State Owned Enterprises 2.90 4.00 1.78 4.25 3.45 2.33 4.62 3.20 4.28 4.28
(0.30) (0.17) (0.53) (0.15) (0.25) (0.41) (0.11) (0.25) (0.14) (0.14)
Urban Population 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.26) (0.27) (0.19) (0.29) (0.31) (0.22) (0.29) (0.22) (0.28) (0.34)
log(j) 0.26 0.35 0.57 0.39 0.58 0.26 0.40 0.45 0.41 0.47
(0.59) (0.48) (0.26) (0.43) (0.26) (0.59) (0.41) (0.34) (0.40) (0.35)
log(j) squared -0.31 -0.36 -0.53 -0.40 -0.55 -0.32 -0.39 -0.45 -0.40 -0.44
(0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
α0 19.92 4.66 7.80 13.34 34.60 0.82 3.67 4.62 5.16 7.34
(0.04) (0.43) (0.23) (0.05) (0.00) (0.89) (0.53) (0.47) (0.39) (0.26)
Number of Observations 2,412 2,412 2,412 2,412 2,412 2,412 2,412 2,412 2,412 2,412
Pseudo-R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16
LR-Test 1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LR-Test 2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Results are from bank level logit regressions of yij on H0j and xij , where yij equals one if bank
i exits in year j and zero otherwise, and H0j is a baseline hazard function. The baseline hazard
function takes the form H0j = α0 + α1 log() + α2
[
log()
]2
. Trust is an index of the level of trust
based on the World Values Survey in 1990, measured at the county-level. Newspaper Subscriptions
is the average number of subscriptions per household measured at the municipality level. Donation
Ratio is the door-collected contribution to charity per capita, divided by average municipality in-
come and multiplied by 1000 for scaling, measured at the municipality level. Principal Component
is the first principal component for the variables Trust, Newspaper Subscriptions, and Donation
Ratio. In Models (1)–(5), the social capital variables are continuous, in Models (6)–(10) the vari-
ables are dummies indicating an above-average level of social capital. Refer to the Data Appendix
for remaining variable definitions. LR-test 1 is a Likelihood Ratio test of the joint significance
of xij. LR-test 2 is a Likelihood Ratio test of the joint significance of log(j) and log(j)
2. The
sample is 1987–2005. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the bank level, and p-values
are reported in parentheses.
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Table 5 Effect of Social Capital on Savings Banks’ Probability of Exit: Baseline Hazard
of Time Indicators
Continuous Social Capital Dichotomous Social Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Trust -4.76 – – – -4.90 -0.69 – – – -0.57
(0.00) – – – (0.00) (0.00) – – – (0.02)
Newspaper Subscriptions – -1.38 – – -1.32 – -0.80 – – -0.73
– (0.01) – – (0.01) – (0.00) – – (0.00)
Donation Ratio – – -7.21 – -9.22 – – -0.81 – -0.62
– – (0.06) – – – – (0.03) – (0.09)
Principal Component – – – -2.72 – – – – -0.74 –
– – – (0.00) – – – – (0.01) –
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962
Pseudo-R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16
LR-Test 1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LR-Test 2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Results are from bank level logit regressions of yij on H0j and xij , where yij equals one if bank
i exits in year j and zero otherwise, and H0j is a baseline hazard function of the form H0j =
α0 +
∑J−1
j
δjDj , where Dj is a dummy for interval j and J is the overall number of intervals
of the sample (estimated α0 and interval dummies are not reported). Dj is omitted from the
regression if no bank exit occurs in interval j. Trust is an index of the level of trust based on
the World Values Survey in 1990 measured at the county-level. Newspaper Subscriptions is the
average number of subscriptions per household measured at the municipality level. Donation Ratio
is the door-collected contribution to charity per capita, divided by average municipality income
and multiplied by 1000 for scaling, measured at the municipality level. Principal Component is the
first principal component for the variables Trust, Newspaper Subscriptions, and Donatio Ratio.
In Models (1)–(5), the social capital variables are continuous, in Models (6)–(10) the variables
are dummies indicating an above-average level of social capital. Control variables are similar to
those in Table 4. LR-test 1 is a Likelihood Ratio test of the joint significance of xij. LR-test 2 is
a Likelihood Ratio test of the joint significance of {Dj}Jj=2. The sample is 1987–2005. Standard
errors are corrected for clustering at the bank level, and p-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 7 Effect of Social Capital on Savings Banks’ Probability of Exit: Robustness to
Timing of Capital Injections During The Norwegian Banking Crisis
Continuous Social Capital Dichotomous Social Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trust -4.37 – – – -0.66 – – –
(0.01) – – – (0.01) – – –
Newspaper Subscriptions – -1.43 – – – -0.83 – –
– (0.00) – – – (0.00) – –
Donation Ratio – – -7.11 – – – -0.69 –
– – (0.04) – – – (0.06) –
Principal Component – – – -2.73 – – – -0.79
– – – (0.00) – – – (0.00)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391
Pseudo-R2 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15
LR-Test 1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LR-Test 2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Results are from bank level logit regressions of yij on H0j and xij , where yij equals one if bank i ex-
its in year j and zero otherwise, and H0j is a baseline hazard function. The year of exit for troubled
banks is redefined as the first year in which they receive capital from the savings banks guarantee
fund. The baseline hazard function takes the form H0j = α0 + α1 log() + α2
[
log()
]2
. Trust is an
index of the level of trust based on the World Values Survey in 1990 measured at the county-level.
Newspaper Subscriptions is the average number of subscriptions per household measured at the
municipality level. Donation Ratio is the door-collected contribution to charity per capita, divided
by average municipality income and multiplied by 1000 for scaling, measured at the municipality
level. Principal Component is the first principal component for the variables Trust, Newspaper
Subscriptions, and Donation Ratio. In Models (1)–(4), the social capital variables are continuous,
in Models (5)–(8) the variables are dummies indicating an above-average level of social capital.
Control variables are similar to those in Table 4. Refer to the Data Appendix for remaining variable
definitions. LR-test 1 is a Likelihood Ratio test of the joint significance of xij. LR-test 2 is a Likeli-
hood Ratio test of the joint significance of log(j) and log(j)2. The sample is 1987–2005. Standard
errors are corrected for clustering at the bank level and p-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 8 Effect of Social Capital on Savings Banks’ Probability of Exit: Robustness to
Time-Varying Bank Performance Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trust -3.37 – – – -5.65 – – –
(0.11) – – – (0.27) – – –
Newspaper Subscriptions – -2.39 – – – -3.64 – –
– (0.00) – – – (0.02) – –
Donation Ratio – – -16.20 – – – -25.54 –
– – (0.01) – – – (0.03) –
Principal Component – – – -4.30 – – – -6.90
– – – (0.00) – – – (0.01)
Equity Ratio (lagged) -22.00 -24.11 -25.52 -24.57 -34.66 -37.21 -39.38 -37.01
(0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Return on Assets (lagged) -0.80 -0.79 -0.76 -0.79 -1.01 -1.03 -1.00 -1.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Past Due Loans (lagged) – – – – -15.65 -13.46 -14.67 -14.84
– – – – (0.22) (0.33) (0.26) (0.30)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,048 2,048 2,048 2,048 1,524 1,524 1,524 1,524
Pseudo-R2 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.35
LR-Test 1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LR-Test 2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Results are from bank level logit regressions of yij on H0j and xij , where yij equals one
if bank i exits in year j and zero otherwise, and H0j is a baseline hazard function of the
form H0j = α0 + α1 log() + α2
[
log()
]2
. Trust is an index of the level of trust based on the
World Values Survey in 1990 measured at the county-level. Newspaper Subscriptions is the
average number of subscriptions per household measured at the municipality level. Donation
Ratio is the door-collected contribution to charity per capita, divided by average municipal-
ity income and multiplied by 1000 for scaling, measured at the municipality level. Principal
Component is the first principal component for the variables Trust, Newspaper Subscriptions,
and Donation Ratio. All social capital variables are continuous. Control variables are similar
to those in Table 4. Refer to the Data Appendix for remaining variable definitions. The co-
efficients on “Return-on-Assets (lagged)” are multiplied by 100 for expositional reasons. LR-
test 1 is a Likelihood Ratio test of the joint significance of xij. LR-test 2 is a Likelihood Ra-
tio test of the joint significance of log(j) and log(j)2. The sample is 1987–2005. Standard er-
rors are corrected for clustering at the bank level and p-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 9 Empirical Survival and Hazard Functions: Commercial
Banks, 1987-2005
Number of commercial banks
Year present that exit Survival Interval
beg. of year during year function hazard function
1987 22 3 87% 14%
1990 19 6 59% 32%
1991 13 1 55% 8%
1993 12 2 45% 17%
1998 10 2 36% 20%
1999 8 1 32% 12%
2000 7 2 23% 29%
2002 5 2 14% 40%
2005 3 0 14% 0%
Summary statistics of commercial banks’ survival and hazard rates.
The first column indicates each year (interval) in the sample. The sec-
ond column gives the number of commercial banks left in the sample
at the beginning of each year. The third column shows the number
of exits during each year. The fourth column shows the Kaplan-Meier
survival function estimate for year j, which equals the proportion of
commercial banks that survive until the end of year j. The fifth column
shows the estimated interval hazard function for year j, which equals
the number of commercial banks that exit in year j, divided by the
number of commercial banks in the sample at the beginning of year j.
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Table 10 Parsimonious Survival Models for Savings Banks and Commercial Banks
Savings Banks Commercial Banks
Level of Number Fraction Estimated Fitted Number Fraction Estimated Fitted
social of banks of parameter on hazard of banks of parameter on hazard
capital in 1987 banks social capital in 1987 banks social capital
High 62 0.3 -2.64 (0.00) 0.07 1 0.0 – –
Middle-High 52 0.3 -2.27 (0.00) 0.09 4 0.2 -1.73 (0.06) 0.15
Middle-Low 43 0.2 -1.83 (0.00) 0.14 8 0.4 -2.12 (0.02) 0.11
Low 34 0.2 -1.76 (0.00) 0.15 9 0.4 -2.41 (0.00) 0.08
Total banks 191 22
Results are from bank level logit regressions of yij on Dk,ij , log(j), and
[
log(j)
]2
, where yij
equals one if bank i exits in year j and zero otherwise, and the first term estimates constant
rates of exit that differ according to four levels of social capital (“Low”, “Middle-Low”, “Middle-
High”, and “High”) corresponding to the quartiles of the distribution of social capital over all
municipalities. Dk is an indicator variable equal to one if the social capital of bank i in year
j belongs to level k. The last two terms capture time variation in the rate of exit. Social cap-
ital is measured as the first principal component for the variables Trust, Newspaper Subscrip-
tions, and Donation Ratio. Regressions with savings banks contain 2,412 observations and re-
gressions with commercial banks contain 184 observations. The sample is 1987–2005. Standard
errors are corrected for clustering at the bank level and p-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 11 Effect of Social Capital on the Probability of Exit: Savings Banks vs. Com-
mercial Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust -0.60 – – –
(0.01) – – –
Trust × Commercial Bank Dummy 1.15 – – –
(0.13) – – –
Newspaper Subscriptions – -0.75 – –
– (0.00) – –
Newspaper Subscriptions × Commercial Bank Dummy – 1.05 – –
– (0.22) – –
Donation Ratio – – -0.52 –
– – (0.12) –
Donation Ratio × Commercial Bank Dummy – – 0.86 –
– – (0.20) –
Principal Component – – – -0.71
– – – (0.01)
Principal Component × Commercial Bank Dummy – – – 0.88
– – – (0.28)
α0 -0.25 2.55 2.01 3.90
(0.96) (0.65) (0.74) (0.50)
Commercial Bank Dummy -0.73 -0.49 -0.57 -0.45
(0.20) (0.27) (0.28) (0.36)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,612 2,612 2,612 2,612
Pseudo-R2 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11
Rate of exit equal for commercial banks in
high and low social capital areas (p-value) 0.39 0.70 0.63 0.82
Results are from bank level logit regressions of yij on H0j and xij , where yij equals one
if bank i exits in year j and zero otherwise. H0j is a baseline hazard function of the form
H0j = α0 + α1 log() + α2
[
log()
]2
(only α0 reported) and the vector xij consists of D
CB
i , a
dummy variable equal to one if bank i is a commercial bank; SChighij , a dummy variable equal
to one if bank i resides in areas with above-average social capital in period j; DCBi · SChighij ,
the interaction of the two, and a vector of control variables similar to those in Table 4. Trust
is an index of the level of trust based on the World Values Survey in 1990 measured at the
county-level. Newspaper Subscriptions is the average number of subscriptions per household
measured at the municipality level. Donation Ratio is the door-collected contribution to char-
ity per capita, divided by average municipality income and multiplied by 1,000 for scaling,
measured at the municipality level. Principal Component is the first principal component
for the variables Trust, Newspaper Subscriptions, and Donation Ratio. Reported p-value is
from a Likelihood Ratio test of the null hypothesis that commercial banks in high and low
social capital areas have the same probability of exit. The sample is 1987–2005. Standard
errors are corrected for clustering at the bank level and p-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 12 Effect of Social Capital on Measures of Efficient Stakeholder Governance
Deposits in Gift Geographical
Home Region Payments Presence
Principal Component 21.38 25.98 31.88 0.23 0.30 0.40 -1.42 -1.62 -1.68
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Equity Ratio (lagged) 74.89 67.93 5.66 4.25 -12.96 -19.21
(0.05) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Return on Assets (lagged) -66.50 -63.13 0.08 0.01 -16.80 -3.03
(0.47) (0.64) (0.01) (0.83) (0.03) (0.71)
Past Due Loans (lagged) 249.23 -5.35 2.59
(0.00) (0.00) (0.48)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,368 2,027 1,509 2,055 1,772 1,364 2,412 2,048 1,524
Pseudo-R2 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.64 0.62 0.71
Results are from panel regressions of savings bank characteristics on bank-level (continuous) so-
cial capital, measured as the first principal component of Trust, Donation Ratio, and Newspaper
Subscriptions. Deposits in Home Region is the fraction of domestic bank deposits raised in the
region of the bank’s headquarter. Gift Payments is the log of the ratio of annual surplus paid
out as charity distribution or injected into the bank’s gift fund for future distribution. Geo-
graphical Presence is the number of municipalities in which the bank has branches. The coef-
ficients on Return-on-Assets (lagged) are multiplied by 100 for expositional reasons. All regres-
sions include time (year) fixed effects. Control variables are similar to those in Table 4. Refer
to the Data Appendix for remaining variable definitions. The sample is 1987-2005. Standard
errors are corrected for clustering at the bank level and p-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 13 Banking Crisis and Savings Banks’ Funding by Local Deposits
All banks Troubled banks
omitted
Entire Peak Entire Peak
crisis crisis crisis crisis
period period period period
High Social Capital Bank 80.32 76.32 96.79 92.23
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
Low Social Capital Bank 78.99 74.55 95.34 90.53
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
High Social Capital Bank × Crisis Dummy -1.72 -2.82 -2.03 -2.86
(0.44) (0.26) (0.37) (0.26)
Low Social Capital Bank × Crisis Dummy -5.40 -7.33 -6.10 -8.61
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,368 2,368 2,277 2,277
Pseudo-R2 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58
Equal level of local deposits for high and
low-social capital banks in crisis years (p-value) 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04
Results are from OLS regressions of Deposits in Home Region on bank-level (dichotomous)
social capital, a bank crisis dummy, the interaction of bank crisis and social capital, and
control variables. Deposits in Home Region is the fraction of domestic bank deposits raised
in the region of the bank’s headquarter. Social Capital is measured as the first principal
component of Trust, Donation Ratio, and Newspaper Subscriptions, and is split into “High”
and “Low” levels relative to the sample average. Bank Crisis Dummy equals one in the
years 1988-2003 in columns entitled “Entire crisis period” and one in the years 1990-2003
in the columns entitled “Peak crisis period.” Columns entitled “Troubled banks omitted”
excludes banks that received financial aid from the savings banks guarantee fund from the
regression. Control variables are similar to those in Table 4. Refer to the Data Appendix
for remaining variable definitions. Reported p-value is from a Likelihood Ratio test of the
null hypothesis that the level of deposits in in home region in the bank crisis years is sim-
ilar for banks in high and low social capital areas. The sample is 1987-2005. Standard er-
rors are corrected for clustering at the bank level and p-values are reported in parentheses.
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1. Appendix
1.1 Variable definitions and data sources
Below we provide definitions of the variables used in the analysis. The regres-
sions are performed with bank-level variables that come from two sources.
(1) Municipality characteristic variables are constructed from
municipality-level data which is mapped into bank-level variables by
computing the weighted average of the variable over the municipalities in
which a given bank has branches. The weights are the fractions of the bank’s
branches in each municipality of operation, cf. Equation (5). Information
on the location of bank branches is from the annual publication Bankplass-
registeret by the Norwegian Financial Services Association (www.fnh.no).
Municipality level data are measured annually from 1987 to 2005 unless
otherwise mentioned. For several variables, however, statistics are not
available in all years of the sample. In these cases, we construct a step-wise
variable in accordance with the years of information that are available
(explained below for each variable) in order to avoid having to drop years
of the sample from a regression. We use variables defined according to the
2005 municipality borders (mergers between municipalities occur during
our sample period). Data on all municipality variables are from Statistics
Norway (www.ssb.no), unless otherwise indicated. Nominal value variables
used in the regressions are deflated with the consumer price index (1998 is
base year).
(2) Bank characteristic variables are from banks’ balance sheet, income,
and cost statements, and are already defined at the individual bank level.
Data are from the banking statistics database (ORBOF) at Statistics
Norway. ORBOF data are in general not publicly available, due to con-
fidentiality clauses in banks’ reports. All bank accounting variables are
corrected for bank mergers and acquisitions by constructing a synthetic
bank in year t− 1 comprised of the banks involved in the merger. Nominal
value variables used in the regressions are deflated with the consumer price
index (1998 is base year).
Municipality-level variables:
Trust: The variable measures the level of trust among Norwegians on a
scale from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating “high trust” and 1 indicating “high
distrust”. The variable comes from the 1990 World Values Survey (WVS)
and is available at the county level.
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Newspaper Subscriptions: The variable is the average number of newspa-
per subscriptions per household, not including freely distributed newspapers
or tabloid papers. Figures of subscription levels are provided by Sigurd Høst
(Høst, 2005) for the years 1984, 1996, and 2002. We construct a step-wise
variable that equals respectively the 1984-level subscriptions in the years
of 1987-1995, the 1996-level subscriptions in the years 1996-2001, and the
2002-level subscriptions in the years 2002-2005.
Donation Ratio: The variable is the amount of donations raised from door-
to-door-collections per capita divided by average municipality income, mul-
tiplied by 1,000 for scaling Amounts donated are available from the national
annual TV charity show TV-aksjonen in the years of 1990 and 2000-2005.
We construct a step-wise variable that equals, respectively, the 1990 Do-
nation Ratio in the years 1987-1995, the 2000 Donation Ratio in the years
1996-2000, and the annual Donation Ratio in the years 2001-2005. Data for
1990 is provided by Redd Barna. Data for 2000-2005 is provided by DnB
NOR (the bank in charge of the administration of the event).
Median Income: The variable is the median gross personal income of per-
sons above 17 years of age and is available from 1993. We adjust the variable
for changes in the consumer price index and set its value in years prior to
1993 equal to the 1993-value.
Median Wealth: The variable is the median taxable gross wealth of persons
above 17 years of age and is available from 1993. We adjust the variable for
changes in the consumer price index and set its value in years prior to 1993
equal to the 1993-value.
Log(Population): The variable equals the log of the number of inhabitants.
Population in Work Force: The variable is defined as the fraction of in-
habitants between 16 and 66 years of age, multiplied by 100 for scaling.
Population Over 67 Years: The variable is defined as the fraction of in-
habitants of at least 67 years of age, multiplied by 100 for scaling.
Population with High education: The variable is the fraction of municipal-
ity population with a university-level (or equivalent) degree obtained in a
program of at least four years of education, multiplied by 100 for scaling.
Unemployment (lagged): The variable is the fraction of municipality pop-
ulation that is unemployed in a given year. Data are available from 1988,
hence 1987 employment values are set equal to the 1988 values. The variable
is lagged by one period.
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Reported Breaches of Law: The variable is the number of reported breaches
of law scaled by municipality population in a given year. The data is available
from 1994 and the values in earlier years are set equal to the 1994 figures.
State Owned Enterprises: The variable is the number of state and munic-
ipality owned non-financial enterprises scaled by municipality population.
The variable is constant and set equal to its 1999 values (available from
1999 only).
Urban Population: The variable is the fraction of municipality population
living in urban settlements. The data are available from 1990 and values
for earlier sample years are set equal to the 1990 figures.
Bank-level variables:
Bank Asset Competition: The variable measures the market share of com-
peting banks in terms of bank assets and equals the (weighted) average share
of total bank assets that are held by competing banks in the municipalities
where a given bank has branches. The weights are the fraction of the bank’s
branches in each municipality where it operates.
Number of Competing Banks: The variable equals the (weighted) average
number of competing banks per 10,000 inhabitants in the municipalities
where a given bank has branches. The weights are the fraction of the bank’s
branches in each municipality where it operates.
Branch Competition: The variable measures the market share of compet-
ing banks in terms of branches and equals the (weighted) average share of
the total number of branches that are owned by competing banks in the mu-
nicipalities where a given bank has branches. The weights are the fraction
of the bank’s branches in each municipality where it operates.
Commercial Bank Competition: The variable measures the market share of
competing commercial banks in terms of branches and equals the (weighted)
average share of the number of branches that are owned by commercial banks
in the municipalities where a given bank has branches. The weights are the
fraction of the bank’s branches in each municipality where it operates.
Only Bank in Home Municipality: A dummy variable equal to one in years
where Bank Asset Competition equals zero, that is, when the bank faces no
competition from other banks in the municipalities where it operates.
Equity Ratio (lagged): The variable is the level of total equity divided by
total assets, multiplied by 100 for scaling. The variable is lagged by one
period.
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Log(Total Assets) (lagged): The variable is the log of total assets, lagged
by one period.
Return on Assets: The variable is computed as interest and non-interest
income minus interest and non-interest expenses, divided by the mean value
of total assets at the end of the current and previous year.
Gift Payments: The variable is the fraction of annual surplus that is paid
out as gifts or set aside for future gift payments in the bank’s gift fund.
Past Due Loans: The variable equals the outstanding gross value of delin-
quent engagements (net of specified loan loss reserves) scaled by net loans. If
a loan or a guarantee of a particular customer is in delinquency, the value of
all engagements of the customer are reported under this item. Delinquencies
must be reported within 3 months. Data are available from 1990.
Loan Loss Provisions: The variable measures changes in specified reserves
on loans, leases, and guarantees during the sample period, scaled by the
mean value of total assets measured at the end of the current and previous
year.
Recovered Loans: The variable is the gross value of reported delinquent
engagements (loans and guarantees) at the beginning of the year, that are
no longer in delinquency at the end of the year, scaled by the gross value
of delinquent engagements at the beginning of the year. Data are available
from 1995.
Deposit Rate Margin: The variable is the money market rate minus the
individual bank’s average deposit rate. Banks report their interest rates as
by year-end on various types of deposits accounts. For each bank we calculate
the weighted average of the reported interest rates, where the weights are
the relative amounts of each type of account. From 1987 till 2000 we use
the ordinary deposit rate, i.e., deposits received from the non-bank public,
excluding deposits on negotiated terms. From 2001 on, the definitions of
deposit categories in the official statistics change and from this date we use
transaction deposits which is the category most similar to ordinary deposits.
As the money market rate we use the effective 3 months NIBOR (Norwegian
Interbank Offered Rate).
Loan Rate Margin: The variable is the interest rate on loans to non-bank-
borrowers minus the money market rate. Banks report their interest rates
as by year-end on various types of loans. For each bank we calculate the
weighted average of the reported interest rates, where the weights are the
relative amounts of each loan type. As the money market rate we use the
effective 3 months NIBOR (Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate). To the lend-
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ing rates we add up-front fees converted to an annualized rate. These are
fees that banks charge on some loans to cover administrative costs etc.
Interest Rate Margin: The variable equals the difference between the Loan
Rate Margin and the Deposit Rate Margin.
Loan Growth: The variable is the growth rate of net loans and leases,
computed as the nominal value of loans and leases minus allowances for
loan losses. Nominal values are converted to real with the consumer price
index prior to computing the growth rate.
Fraction of C&I Loans (lagged): The variable equals to the fraction of
commercial and industrial loans scaled by net loans. Businesses that are
fully or partly owned by municipalities are excluded. The variable is lagged
by one period.
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1.2 Basic descriptive statistics
In this section we present and comment on basic descriptive statistics for
the municipality and bank-level variables.
Table A1 shows the level of correlation between pairs of variables used in
the regressions. Pair-wise correlations between the social capital measures
are low. As expected, Donation Ratio is quite highly (negatively) corre-
lated with Median Income. It is also negatively correlated with Population
in Work Force and Urban Population, these two measures are presumably
both picking up that individuals in large cities donate less. The other two
social capital variables do not display particularly high correlation with any
of the control variables. In general, the correlation table shows no sign of
multicollinearity between any of pairs of variables.
Table A3 displays statistics for the municipality-level control variables
used in the regressions. We observe that the municipalities vary consider-
ably in size. The, by far, largest municipality is Oslo, the Norwegian capital,
with more than half a million inhabitants, whereas the smallest munici-
pality has less than 300. Importantly, there are no bank branches in these
small municipalities which therefore do not influence the regressions because
they receive a zero weight in the construction of the bank-level variables.
Municipalities display variation in several other population characteristics
such as education and the proportion of people living in urban settlements.
While Median Income and Median Wealth show little variation, the num-
ber of Reported Breaches of Law and State Owned Enterprises also differ
substantially across the municipalities.
Table A4 displays statistics for low and high social capital banks as well
as tests of differences in the means between the groups. We calculate each
bank’s average level of social capital over its lifetime and subsequently split
banks into groups using the 33 and 67 percentiles. The column values are
the average level of the variables over banks and years in the low and high
social capital subgroups.
Trust and Newspaper Subscriptions both indicate that a larger fraction
of banks survive in the high social capital group, but none of the differences
are statistically significant. In contrast, the Donation Ratio measure has a
lower fraction of banks surviving in high social capital group. Between 8 and
21 percent of the high-social capital banks are classified as Only Bank in
Home Municipality in all years of their lifetime, whereas the same is true
for 4–8 percent of the low-social capital banks (“all” years because the ta-
ble displays time-averaged values). These figures reflect that the Norwegian
banking industry has many small banks with a distinct local orientation
where many banks have offices in only one municipality and are “alone”
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in that municipality if no other bank opens offices. This fact may at first
appear surprising given that regulatory barriers to entry have been absent
for two decades at the end of the sample, but it is likely an artifact of the
small size of many municipalities. The Donation Ratio measure appears to
pick up many such single banks, but fewer of them survive, suggesting that
being the only bank in a local area does not automatically cause survival.
In any case, as a precaution, we control explicitly for such single banks in
our regressions.
The bank competition measures, however, indicate that high-social capital
banks do not operate without competition. The three competition measures,
Bank Asset Competition, Branch Competition, and Commercial Bank Com-
petition, capture the market share of competing banks in terms of assets,
branches, and commercial bank branches respectively. Measured in terms
of assets, competing banks’ market share is lower for high-social capital
banks, and significantly so for Newspaper Subscriptions and Donations. In
contrast, measured in terms of branches, competing banks’ market share is
higher for high-social capital banks, for all three social capital measures, but
the difference between the high and low social capital groups is significant
only according to the Donation Ratio measure. The third competition mea-
sure shows that more of the competing branches faced by high-social capital
banks belong to other savings banks. Competition measured in terms of
commercial banks’ branches is lower for high social capital banks, for all
of the three social capital measures, but significant only for Donation Ra-
tio. Overall, a picture emerges of an industry where the average small and
medium-sized savings banks compete against each other’s branch networks
in the local markets, and, in addition, around 10 percent of the banks operate
in areas with no other bank. High social capital banks are well represented
in both groups.
As for the remaining variables, significant differences in characteristics
common to all three measures of social capital are that high social capital
areas have smaller populations, have less people in the work force, have
lower median income, lower reported number of breaches of law, and a lower
fraction the population resides in urban settlements.
Considering the bank financial variables, there is little difference across
the social capital groups. Return on Assets, Gift Payments, Deposit and
Loan Rate Margins, or Loan Loss Provisions show large variation across
the two groups. The average proportion of Past Due Loans is marginally
lower for high social capital banks, and the proportion of Recovered Loans
is higher. Loan Growth is higher for low social capital banks suggesting that
it is especially this group of banks that have expanded during the sample.
54
The fraction of commercial and industrial loans in the banks’ portfolios is
around 30 percent for both groups.
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Table A3 Descriptive Statistics of Municipality-Level Variables
Unit Median Mean Std.dev. Min. Max.
Trust - 4.07 4.06 0.09 3.92 4.33
Newspaper Subscriptions - 1.10 1.13 0.28 0.39 2.17
Donation Ratio - 0.15 0.17 0.09 0 1.14
Population - 4,364 10,112 28,522 212 529,846
Population with High Education % 1.27 1.57 1.16 0 11.30
Population over 67 Years % 15.80 15.60 3.67 5.68 31.30
Population in Work Force % 64.71 64.32 2.81 49.33 72.22
Urban Population % 71.01 66.77 26.27 0.06 99.80
Median Income ’000 NOK 169.9 176.0 30.5 119.0 431.4
Median Wealth ’000 NOK 124.7 130.8 31.8 54.2 356.9
Unemployment (lagged) % 2.59 2.79 1.32 0 12.00
Reported Breaches of Law - 6.31 7.85 17.81 0.08 947.91
State Owned Enterprises - 4.77 5.51 4.08 0.70 81.30
The table displays municipality-level descriptive statistics for the main variables used
in the regressions. Statistics are based on all 433 municipalities, including munic-
ipalities that do not have any bank branches. The sample period is 1987–2005.
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